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NON-TECHNICAL SUMMARY 5
NON-TECHNICAL SUMMARY
How does the classical theory of job search fit the reality of the Russian
labor market? Why is the level of total unemployment much higher than
the level of registered unemployment? How effective are the job place-
ment services provided by the Public Employment Office: what individu-
als have higher chances of finding a job and how quickly do they find
jobs? How do the rules and regulations governing registered unemploy-
ment affect the duration of individuals' unemployment spells? These are
the questions we attempt to answer through an empirical study, thereby
contributing to the development and better understanding of the subject
of economics of transition.
In this paper, we adopt the methodology of transition data analysis to in-
vestigate the process of the population's adaptation to the government's
system of employment assistance in Russia and the effects of this sys-
tem on the duration of job searches and the relative chances of obtain-
ing employment for various socio-demographic groups of population.
The goal of this paper is to identify and measure factors affecting the
duration of registered unemployment and the chances of an individual's
transition from unemployment to employment.
Our study reveals two major groups of unemployed, which have different
motivations. The first group consists of individuals obtaining unemploy-
ment status and unemployment benefits related to their wages earned at
their last place of employment. These individuals find a job with the as-
sistance of the PEO or on their own and exit unemployment during one
year. The second group is individuals with the motivation of retaining
their unemployed status and staying registered with the PEO as long as
possible. The groups we mentioned differ significantly in terms of their
socio-demographic and professional characteristics.
For instance, it is more difficult for the unemployed with low qualification
and professional skills to reject the vacancies offered by the PEO, and as
a result they are running a higher chance of exiting registered unem-
ployment. The majority of the individuals in that group are young people
entering the job market for the first time.
We found that women tend to have longer periods of registered unem-
ployment than men. Our empirical results provide two possible yet not
mutually exclusive explanations for that. One is gender discrimination
while the second explanation is that married women may prefer to stay
unemployed longer because of the financial support that already exists in
the family.
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The legislation governing the registration of unemployed individuals and
the timing and amount of unemployment benefits received is found to be
a significant factor in determining the duration of unemployment and the
risk of transition from unemployment. Receiving the minimum level of
unemployment benefits, for example, significantly increases the exit rate
in the corresponding group of unemployed relative to the individuals re-
ceiving higher levels of unemployment benefits.
In general, our paper illustrates that the rules of registering with the PEO
and obtaining benefits together with the specific features of the Russian
economic crisis significantly affect the behavior of individuals in this
segment of the labor market. Very often these institutional effects are
hard to explain in the framework of the classical job search theory. An
empirical study of the processes undergoing in the Russian labor market
may help us to modify the assumptions of the traditional theories and
serve as a base for developing the economic theory of transition econo-
mies.
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1. INTRODUCTION
One of the major characteristics of the economic transformation of
the Russian Federation from a centralized system to a market-based
one was the abandoning of the fundamental principle of the socialist
system — full employment. In fact, the low efficiency of the old economic
system was to a large extent explained by the excessive labor resources
employed by the state-owned companies. The economic reforms in the
countries of Central and Eastern Europe, which started earlier than in
Russia, resulted in a sharp increase in unemployment. By 1996, the un-
employment rate was 12.5 per cent in Bulgaria, 10.5 per cent in Hun-
gary, and 13.6 per cent in Poland (e.g., Ham, Svejnar, Terrel, 1998). The
level of unemployment in Russia has been lower than in other transition
economies but exhibits an increasing trend (see Table 1).
Table 1. Economic activity of the Russian population of able-bodied age (annual
percentages of population of able-bodied age).
Year
Employment
level
Total level
of unemployment*
Registered
unemployment**
1992 79.9 5.1 0.8
1993 77.3 5.9 1.1
1994 74.4 8.2 2.3
1995 72.5 9.6 3.3
1996 71.2 9.8 3.6
1997 67.9 12.0 2.9
1998 65.7 13.5 2.0
1999 67.9 13.0 1.8
Source: Russian Statistical Yearbook (2000).
* Total level of unemployment is based on the results of surveys undertaken according to the
methodology of the International Labor Organization (ILO);
** The registered unemployment level based on the information from the PEOs.
Table 1 points out the specific feature of unemployment in Russia — the
level of total unemployment is significantly higher than the level of reg-
istered unemployment.
MODELING LABOR MARKET BEHAVIOR8
The formation of the labor market in Russia was accompanied by the
creation of an institutional infrastructure to deal with unemployment. The
Public Employment Offices (PEOs) were created by government decree
in 1991 to assist in maintaining employment and to render financial sup-
port to the unemployed registered with this institution. Registration with
the PEO is voluntary and therefore not all unemployed individuals choose
to register. Due to that fact, Russian government statistics report two
levels of unemployment: the registered unemployment level based on
the information from the PEOs and the total unemployment level based
on the results of surveys undertaken according to the methodology of
the International Labor Organization (ILO).
Although registered unemployment is significantly lower than the unem-
ployment figures attained based on the ILO methodology, one should
take into consideration the absolute size of the Russian labor market. As
of 1998, the number of unemployed registered with the PEO amounted
to two million individuals. The average duration of registered unemploy-
ment increased from 4.6 months in 1992 to 6.5 months in 1998 (Russian
Statistical Yearbook, 1999).
Why is registered unemployment lower than the level of total unemploy-
ment? Why did the duration of registered unemployment increase? How
effective is the job placement mechanism of the PEO? Who among the
registered unemployed have higher chances of employment and how
fast do they obtain employment? These questions were previously con-
sidered in the papers dealing with the countries of Central and Eastern
Europe. Ham, Svejnar, and Terrell (1998) investigate the differences in
unemployment in the Czech Republic and Slovakia, which was previously
a unified country. The authors attempt to answer the question regarding
the optimal balance between free market incentives with minimum in-
volvement of the state and an adequate system of social protection for
unemployed individuals. The issues raised are investigated by looking at
the effect of the socio-demographic characteristics of the unemployed
and the level of financial support rendered to them on the probability of
transiting from unemployment within a certain time interval. The paper
adopts the transition data analysis and illustrates the advantage of this
method for this type of study. Transition data analysis is also employed
in a series of papers by Lubyova and vanOurs (1999a, 1999b, 1998,
1997) in analyzing the effects of changes in the rules and regulations
governing unemployment in Slovak Republic. The paper by Earl and
Pauna (1996) deals with issues of unemployment in Romania. Non-
parametric methods of unemployment duration analysis are extensively
presented by Micklewright and Nagy (1999, 1998, 1996) with an applica-
tion to Hungary. The analysis of the unemployment duration based on
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the data supplied by the PEOs of Moscow in 1993 is presented by Sol-
logub and Pascal (1997). More complex results can be founded in the
work of Foley (1997) who uses RSLM data to study the determinants of
unemployment duration in Russia. Standing and Chetvernina (1997) use
their own survey data to analyze the probability of attaining unemploy-
ment status, the demand for labor and the motivations of the unem-
ployed's behavior.1
The distinct feature of a large number of the above mentioned papers is
the usage of econometric methodology of transition data analysis. It al-
lows one to estimate the probability of transition from unemployment as
a function of various factors such as socio-demographic characteristics,
unemployment benefit payments, changes in legislation, etc. The tradi-
tionally insufficient use of this methodology in the empirical research is
related to the rather complicate mathematical framework and the re-
quired numerical algorithms and computational resources.
In our paper we adopt the transition data methodology and attempt to
investigate the mechanism of the population's adaptation to the govern-
ment system of employment assistance. We also investigate the effect of
the employment assistance system on the duration of unemployment and
the chances of obtaining employment for different socio-demographic
groups of the population. The legislative rules for obtaining unemploy-
ment status and the size and duration of unemployment benefits are re-
lated to the probability that an individual finds a job with the assistance
of a PEO or without it.
The objects of our investigation are the unemployed individuals regis-
tered at the PEOs of Rostov-on-Don during the period 01.01.97 to
31.12.98. Rostov-on-Don is the biggest industrial city in southern Russia.
With its population of over one million, the share of unemployed individu-
als registered at PEOs by the end of 1998 amounted to 1.4 percent of
the total employed population in the city while total unemployment was
10.2 per cent according to the survey. This figure is close to the regis-
tered unemployment in other big cities in the country (Russian Statistical
Yearbook, 1999).
In the context of our analysis, we suggest that the process of freeing and
redistributing labor resources on the registered segment of the labor
market of big industrial cities in Russia is determined by similar factors.
The primary reasons for that are certain similarities in the economic en-
vironment of these cities as well as in factors driving the formation of lo-
cal labor markets.
                                               
1 It should be mentioned that econometric methods were not used in their work.
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First, the all-Russian law governing registered unemployment specifies
the rules for registering at PEOs, the requirements for receiving unem-
ployment status as well as the terms, duration and the size of unem-
ployment benefits. In other words it creates a uniform legal framework
for local labor markets and provides particular incentives for those
searching for a job (see Appendix A1).
Second, big industrial cities in Russia are typically characterized by a di-
versified economy consisting of high-tech military-oriented enterprises,
machine building, food, and light industries as well as many others.
Moreover, they have a well-developed educational infrastructure and a
system of on-the-job and off-the-job training adapted to the needs of
the enterprises in the city and region. Another distinctive feature of these
cities is the presence of a large industrial enterprise that historically ac-
counted for a disproportionately large share of employment.
In this context we argue that the processes of traumatic restructuring
and structural crisis in the economies of the big industrial cities would
likely influence the behavior of the registered share of unemployed in a
similar manner.
Third, a characteristic feature of the Russian labor market is low and de-
creasing labor migration. The primary reason for that is high Russia-wide
unemployment, while another perhaps equally important reason is the
preserved system of population registration (propiska).
In our opinion, the similarity of the key social and economic problems of
the big industrial cites and uniform legislative framework make it possible
to draw rather general conclusions from a study of one representative
city. Moreover, the results for one city can be interesting per se since,
as we shall show later, registered unemployment comprises a very large
group of the local population.
2. LABOR MARKET IN ROSTOV-ON-DON DURING
THE PERIOD UNDER INVESTIGATION
The economic environment of Rostov-on-Don was characterized by a re-
vival during the period under our investigation. Since 1997 the economy
started to grow, leading to an increase in employment. The index of pro-
duction volume rose to 2.3% relative to the previous year.2 This indicator
fell 1.9% in 1998 and increased dramatically by 41.3% in 1999. Despite
the general growth in employment, the dynamics of this growth in vari-
ous sectors of the economy were uneven as illustrated by Table 2.
                                               
2 In 1996 this indicator was 68.7%.
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Table 2. The dynamics of employment across different groups of companies in
Rostov-on-Don (in percent to the year indicated).
1997 to 1996 1998 to 1997 1998 to 1996
Total 114.9 95.1 109.3
Material sector 109.4 92.3 101.0
Non-material sector 128.6 101.2 130.1
Medium and large companies
and organizations 98.8 102.3 101.1
Material sector 90.3 103.2 93.2
Non-material sector 113.2 101.2 114.5
Small companies
and organizations 159.0 82.9 131.8
Material sector 144.5 79.7 115.2
Non-material sector 380 101.2 385
Source: Rostov Oblast: Statistical Yearbook (1999).
According to Table 2, the largest swings in employment can be observed
in small business. The sharp increase in overall employment from 1996
to 1997 was followed by a substantial decrease in 1998. In addition
these changes were especially pronounced in the small firms of the pro-
duction sector. The observed dynamics can be explained by the higher
risks and uncertainty of small businesses in general and the influence of
the August 1998 financial crisis.3
The erratic trend in medium and large firms' employment was more pro-
nounced in the production sector: a decrease in employment in 1997
was followed by an increase in 1998. Employment in the non-production
sector was steadily rising during 1996 – 1998.
The growth of business activity in the city led to a decrease in the num-
ber of registered unemployed. The level of registered unemployment as
a share of the economically active population amounted to 1.2% in 1996,
0.9% in 1997, and 1.4% in 1998. By the middle of 1999, the unemploy-
ment level in the city decreased to 1.2%.
During the period we study, the labor market of Rostov-on-Don was
characterized by the presence of both officially registered vacancies and
                                               
3 On the other hand, the August 1998 crisis led to an increase in import prices
and an increase in demand for domestically produced goods.
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vacancies outside the PEOs. The structure of these vacancies, though,
differed significantly from the unemployment structure. For example, in
1998 there was one vacancy per every blue-collar worker unemployed,
but only one vacancy per every two white-collar worker unemployed.
According to a survey of the unemployed undertaken by the city's PEOs
in October 1999,4 an unemployed individual received on average 13.3
offers of vacancies from the PEO, 3.5 of these vacancies were rejected
by the unemployed individual while in the rest of the cases, the employer
rejected the individual candidate. In November 1999, the PEOs also un-
dertook a survey of non-registered unemployed. The corresponding re-
sults were the following: 6 received vacancies on average, 3.7 positions
were rejected by the unemployed, and for the other positions, the appli-
cant was rejected by the employer. The results indicate that the officially
registered unemployed face higher probability of being rejected by a
potential employer.
The dominating reasons for rejecting an offered vacancy are insufficient
pay (60/70% in two surveys respectively), unsatisfactory working condi-
tions (30/40%), and the distance from home to work (20/25%). Only
13.2% indicated that the reason for rejecting a vacancy was the re-
quirement to change a profession.
When it comes to the reasons why employers rejected potential candi-
dates, the results of two surveys differed significantly (see Table 3). Of
the registered unemployed, 71% indicated that the vacancy was already
taken at the moment of their inquiry with the employer. This reason was
only mentioned by 35.1% of the non-registered unemployed. Of the
registered unemployed, 53.3% mentioned their insufficient qualifications
and experience as a reason for rejection. The corresponding number for
the non-registered unemployed is only 36.6%. Age discrimination was
sited as a reason by 37% of the registered and 43.9% of the non-
registered unemployed.
Table 3 shows that independent of unemployment duration, the main
reason employers rejected an applicant is the absence of vacancies. We
can provide two explanations for this fact. First, the vacancy database is
not updated in a timely fashion. Second, the employer and the unem-
ployed possibly enter in an unofficial deal to report the absence of a va-
cancy as a reason for rejection. In the latter case, the unemployed might
have an incentive to preserve his unemployment status due to a number
of reasons such as already having unofficial employment, the presence
                                               
4 The survey covered 932 unemployed individuals, which amounted to 22.4% of
the officially registered unemployed at the time of the survey.
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of non-monetary income sources allowing to him maintain acceptable
living standards, the desire to preserve his or her unemployment status
until retirement.
Table 3. The employer's reasons for rejecting the registered unemployed
(percent of respondents providing each reason).
Unemployment duration interval
Rejection reason
Up to 3 months 3.1 to7 months 7.1 to12 months
Unsatisfactory
qualifications 45.7 47.6 49.2
Unsuitable profession 15.0 23.6 20.0
Unavailability of vacancy 62.5 61.6 63.7
Unsuitable age 22.2 37.6 45.9
Presence of children 2.4 3.6 5.9
Health conditions 3.4 3.6 4.8
Unsuitable gender 3.4 8.8 8.2
It is illustrative that an increase in individual's unemployment duration
leads to an increase in the frequency that an employer rejects a candi-
date for reasons such as unsatisfactory qualifications or profession of
the unemployed, unsuitable age of the unemployed, presence of young
children or poor health. In other words, the process of vacancy fulfill-
ment serves as a sorting device with "higher quality" workers leaving the
unemployment pool earlier.
3. DATA AND METHODOLOGY
3.1. Dataset description
The data set we use is a unique one. As we mentioned before, the PEOs
were set up in 1991, but the computer database collection began only in
1996.5 The database includes complex information on all individuals who
ask the PEO for assistance in finding a job. The PEO keeps an individual
record of each person (the individual registry card (IRC)), which is con-
tinuously updated if there are any changes in an individual's characteris-
                                               
5 From 1992 to 1996, the electronic database contains data only for selected dis-
tricts of Rostov-na-Donu. The rest of the data is in paper form.
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tics. The PEO does not erase the past records of individuals with multiple
inquiries.
IRC contains over 250 characteristics of an inquiring individual. These
characteristics include social-demographic information on a registered
individual (age, gender, marital status, number of children and depend-
ents, etc.), professional and qualification characteristics (working experi-
ence, previous wage, education, profession and qualification etc.), the
reasons for entering unemployment (voluntary leave, fired, outside of the
labor force).
For individuals terminating their registration with the PEO, there is infor-
mation on the destination of their transition: employment (with the type
of employment), early retirement, violations of registration rules (with the
type of violation), retraining, etc.
The database also contains information related to the amounts and tim-
ing of unemployment benefits and extra transfers received by a regis-
tered unemployed.
For individuals sent for retraining, there is information on the duration of
the retraining, results, and the stipend received.
The database of the PEO is formed by self-selection and therefore is not
representative of the unemployment segment of the labor market as a
whole. However, this data is used in determining the official level of un-
employment and developing government programs to assist the unem-
ployed. At the present time, this is the only source of systematic infor-
mation on the behavior of the unemployed population.
We form an inflow sample by selecting the individuals registering with the
PEO between 01/01/1997 and 31/12/1998, and removing the individuals
who were registered before that period. The choice of the inflow period
is dictated by the large changes in unemployment legislation around that
period which were likely to affect the behavior of the unemployed.6 The
                                               
6 In May 1996 "The Amendment to the Law on Employment in the Russian Fed-
eration" was published. It significantly changed the composition of the registered
unemployed by allowing individuals entering the job market for the first time and
individuals voluntarily quitting their jobs to obtain unemployment status and to re-
ceive unemployment benefits. "The Amendment to the Law on Employment in the
Russian Federation," published in May 1999, changed the rules for paying unem-
ployment benefits to laid-off individuals. As we mentioned before, laid-off indi-
viduals received both unemployment insurance from the employer and unem-
ployment benefits from the PEO during the first three months of unemployment.
The new law does not allow these two payments to overlap by shifting the unem-
ployment benefit payments to the end of unemployment insurance payments.
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duration spells of individuals entering unemployment during a specified
inflow period are traced back until 30/06/99.7
During the period under investigation, 72010 citizens registered with the
PEO, 6977 inquired with the PEO twice, 1232 — three times, and 398 —
more than three times.8
We measure the duration of unemployment in days beginning from the
date of registration and ending with the date of registration termination
with the PEO.
We distinguish the following reasons for closing the IRC:
• employment (all types: temporary, permanent, etc.) with the assis-
tance of the PEO;
• termination of registration without finding employment with the assis-
tance of the PEO (which includes individuals finding a job outside of
the PEO).
We removed the individuals transiting to early retirement and individuals
sent to retraining from the sample.
The duration period is considered right-censored if an unemployed indi-
vidual was still registered with the PEO at the end of the observation pe-
riod.9
For further analysis, we selected variables reflecting the socio-
demographic and professional status of the registered unemployed, the
variables describing the circumstances of entering unemployment and
the size of the unemployment benefits and other transfers received. The
definitions and simple statistics for selected variables are reported in
Table 4.
                                               
7 The authors of several other papers select their inflow sample in a similar man-
ner. Lubyova and vanOurs (1997) use the data from the employment office of the
Slovak Republic and analyze unemployed individuals entering unemployment dur-
ing the first two quarters of 1992 and 1995 and trace them until the end of 1995.
Ham, Svejnar, and Terrell (1998) select the registered unemployed in the Czech
and Slovak Republics who registered during the period from October 1, 1991, to
March 31, 1992, and trace them until the end of July of 1993.
8 In this paper, we consider the individuals with multiple unemployment spells ei-
ther as separate individuals or alternatively, we only select the first spell of unem-
ployment.
9 When we analyze the risk of exiting from unemployment with the assistance of
the PEO, the duration spells of individuals exiting without getting a job with PEO
assistance is considered censored and vice verse.
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Table 4. Definitions and descriptive statistics of variables used in the analysis
(in percent).
Variables Total sample
Exit from the
PEO with
employment
Exit from the
PEO without
employment
SEX =1, if male 32.80 35.21 31.61
SEX =0, if female 67.20 64.79 68.39
AGE1 = 1, if age ≤  20 years,
= 0 otherwise 10.33 11.11 10.03
AGE2 = 1, if 20 < age ≤  30 years,
= 0 otherwise 26.54 29.06 23.24
AGE3 = 1, if 30 < age≤  40 years,
= 0 otherwise 24.91 24.99 25.24
AGE4 = 1, if 40 < age≤  50 years,
= 0 otherwise 27.36 25.66 29.37
AGE5 = 1, if age > 50 years,
= 0 otherwise 10.87 9.19 13.13
LEV1 = 1, if high education,
=0 otherwise 36.34 35.80 34.41
LEV2 = 1, if professional secondary
education,
= 0 otherwise 28.59 27.57 29.61
LEV3 = 1, if general secondary
education,
= 0 otherwise 18.90 19.62 19.71
LEV4 = 1, if below general secondary
education,
= 0 otherwise 16.17 17.00 16.27
MS = 1, married individuals 53.42 53.32 54.83
MS = 0, not married individuals 46.58 47.58 45.17
PR1 = 1, individuals without
profession,
 = 0 otherwise10 11.61 13.04 10.45
PR2 = 1, blue-collar profession
during last employment,
= 0 otherwise. 37.29 38.88 37.14
                                               
10 This variable takes the value of one for individuals whose criteria for a suitable
job offer do not depend on their previous profession. For example, if an individual
has not worked for a substantially long period prior to registering with the PEO, he
or she would be counted as an individual without a profession and wage.
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Continued from p. 16
Variables Total sample
Exit from the
PEO with
employment
Exit from the
PEO without
employment
PR3 = 1, if white-collar profession
during last employment,
= 0 otherwise 51.10 48.08 52.40
MINPOS = 1, if average benefits
do not exceed the minimum one,
= 0 otherwise. 51.34 54.5 53.59
SUM_IJD = 1, if there are extra
benefits for dependents,
= 0 otherwise 36.01 34.95 37.26
NEZANYAT = 1, transiting
to unemployment from outside
of the labor force,
= 0 otherwise 25.53 26.44 25.73
PR_UV = 1, for voluntary leave
from the last employment,
= 0 otherwise 40.39 43.89 31.76
DURB = average duration
of unemployment 156.34 136.60 216.27
Total number of observations11 21574 17241 4333
3.2. Econometric framework
The analysis of transition data is a fairly new but rapidly growing area of
econometrics. The excellent presentations of econometric aspects of
transition data analysis can be found in the works of Kiefer (1988), and
Lancaster (1990). Good survey and applications of various techniques of
duration analysis are in Tasiran (1996).
The choice component in individual behavior distinguishes the
econometric analyses of transition data from statistical survival analysis
and lends richness but also adds complexity to econometric work. Lan-
caster, in explaining why he used the term "transition data" in his work
as opposed to "duration data" points out that transition data refers not
only to how long events last, but also to what happens when they end.
The basic methods we can use to analyze the risk of transition from un-
employment to alternative states are the flexible non-parametric methods.
                                               
11 The total number of observations includes both censored and uncensored ob-
servations.
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The main complication one faces applying the above methods to data
like ours is the presence of censored observations. The next paragraph
illustrates the problem of censored observations as it applies to our
study.
The goal of registering with the PEO is to find a job. As we illustrated in
Appendix A1, there are possibilities that some registered individuals ter-
minate their relationship with the PEO without becoming employed with
its assistance. Moreover, at the end of the observation period, we often
observe that some people are still in the process of searching for a job.
The immediate conclusion is that for a number of individuals in the data
set, we do not know the exact time passed before finding a job. The only
information we have is that the time spent searching for a job exceeded
the observation period. Finally, it is important to notice that data like ours
can not be analyzed ignoring censored observations since it would be
logical to infer that a longer period spent searching for a job would lead
to a larger number of censored observations.
The database we use spans the information for unemployed individuals
registered with the PEO across time, which means that we observe the
matrix mn ×  where n = 1, ..., N is the number of events (e.g., registra-
tion or receiving unemployment status) and m is the matrix of descriptive
variables for individuals (e.g., time periods, social-demographic charac-
teristics, professional and qualification characteristics). The time vari-
ables for each individual captures the time elapsed between the changes
in the time-dependent variables and the events of transition from one
state to another.
The Fig. 1 illustrates the hypothetical space of states and events.
0     t1    t2    t3             t3 + ∆t          t4             t5 + ∆t         T      Time
Unemployed 4
Unemployed 3
Unemployed 2
Unemployed 1
Fig. 1. Time related variables.
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The observations depicted in the above graph show that we can observe
two complete observations for unemployed individuals 2 and 3. Unem-
ployed 2 registered with the PEO at time t2 and deregistered (transited
to an alternative state) at time t5 + ∆t. The unemployment duration in
this case is (t5 + ∆t) – t2.
The unemployed individuals 1 and 4 continued to be unemployed outside
the period T we observe. In this situation we do not know what is going
to happen to them, but we still want to use the information about these
individuals. In order to do so, we create a binary variable accounting for
the censoring (the observation is not complete).
Assume that unemployed individual i registered with the PEO at time ti
and deregistered at time ti + ∆t. The observed time period is from time 0
to time T, where T is a finite time limit. In order for an observation to be
complete, it has to fall inside the interval [0, T ]. Thus the censoring indi-
cator δi  is defined as



∆+<
∆+≥=δ
.(censored)  :PEO the  withremained individual an if 1,
;)uncensored( :period observed the
 during PEO the left individual an if 0,
ttT
ttT
i
ii
From this point on, let T denote the duration (survival time) of being reg-
istered with the PEO. The distribution of T can be characterized by the
following three equivalent functions:
1. Survival Function, S(t), which is the probability that an individual will
stay registered unemployed longer than time period t
).(1)()( tFtTPtS −=>= (1)
It follows that S(t) is a non-decreasing function of time with the proper-
ties that S (t) = 1 for t = 0, and S(t) = 0 for t = ∞. Therefore, in our
context, the probability of being unemployed in time zero is 1, and the
probability of being lifelong unemployed is zero. In practice, if there are
no censored observations, the survival function is estimated as a propor-
tion of the unemployed registered for longer than t.
2. Probability Density Function is the probability of transition from un-
employment to an alternative state in an infinitesimally small unit of time
dt. It can be expressed as
dt
dF(t)
tf =)(  (2)
3. The Hazard Function, λ(t), is the "risk" of leaving unemployment dur-
ing a very small time interval, assuming that the individual was unem-
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ployed in the beginning of that period:
0
( )
( ) Pr( | ) /lim
1 ( ) t
f t
t t T t t T t t
F t ∆ →
= = ≤ < + ∆ ≥ ∆
−
λ , (3)
where F(t) is a distribution function , and f(t) is a density function.
The hazard function can be interpreted as the instantaneous probability
that the event of transition from unemployment will take place in the in-
terval [t, t + ∆t] provided that it has not occurred before the beginning of
this interval. However, the hazard function is not a conditional probability
as it can be greater than one; therefore, it is called an intensity or risk
function. For a small ∆t, λ(t)⋅∆t can be written as an approximation of the
conditional probability ( )tTttTtP ≥∆+<≤ | .
A useful starting point of the transition data analysis is the non-
parametric method. The non-parametric approaches to time dependence
are important because the available theory rarely suggests the qualitative
shape of the baseline hazard rate and precise functional form. At this
stage, graphical methods are useful for displaying the data on duration
and for preliminary analyses, perhaps to suggest functional forms.
One of the most common methods of non-parametric estimation of )(tS
in the presence of censored observations is the product-limit estimation
method or Kaplan – Meier estimator.
Let hj be the number of completed spells of duration tj  (j = 1, ..., k),
where tj is the duration period of length j (expressed in a chosen unit of
time). Let mj be the number of observations censored between tj and
tj+1; mk is the number of observations with duration greater than tj, the
longest complete duration. For example, if we consider the periods of
unemployment measured in weeks, then the spells beginning six weeks
before the end of the observation period and still in progress at its end
are regarded as censored between 6 and 7 weeks. The information
content in this censored spell is that the actual duration is longer than 6
weeks. Let nj be the number of spells either completed or censored be-
fore the duration tj.
( )∑
≥
+=
K
ji
iij hmn .
An estimator for λ(t) is
jjj nht /)( =λ
!
.
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The corresponding estimator for the survival is
( ) ( )∏ ∏
= =
−=−=
j
i
j
i
iiiij nhntS
1 1
1/)( λ
!!
, (4)
which is the Kaplan – Meier or product-limit estimator (it can also be in-
terpreted as the maximum likelihood estimator).12
An important task in the analysis of duration data is the comparison
of survival curves. We have variables (for example, sex, age, profes-
sion, etc.) that may be related to the risk of transition. These variables
can either be used to define strata and the resulting survival distribution
function estimates visually comparedor they can be used to construct
statistics that test for the association between the covariates and the
duration. The LIFETEST procedure of SAS can compute two such test
statistics: censored data linear rank statistics based on the exponential
scores and based on the Wilcoxon scores.13
Another popular method allowing the estimation of the joint effect of
factors affecting the risk of transition is a proportional hazard model de-
veloped by Cox (1972). The hazard in this model consists of two compo-
nents — the time-varying baseline hazard component ( )(0 tλ ) and an indi-
vidual specific component, ( )Θ;xϕ . Formally,
( )Θϕλ=Θλ ;)();( 0 xtxt , (5)
where x is a vector of individual specific observable characteristics and Θ
is a vector of parameters.
The proportionality of risks implyes  that the ratio of risk functions for two
groups in the sample remains constant during the observed period.
We choose a flexible way of specifying )(0 tλ that allows for duration de-
pendency by assuming that the baseline hazard is piecewise constant
(see Lancaster, 1990). This implies that for the baseline hazard, unem-
                                               
12 To obtain the product-limit estimator, we use the LIFETEST procedure of SAS
software. The corresponding estimate of the standard error is obtained using the
Greenwood formula.
13 The corresponding tests are known as the log rank test and the Wilcoxon test,
respectively.
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ployment can be divided into k intervals:
( ) 10 γλ =t , if 10 ct ≤≤ ,
2γ , if 21 ctc ≤< ,
…... …...
kγ , if ∞<<− tck 1 ,
where kγ  are parameters to be estimated, the kc 's are points in time
and
∞<<<<<
−121 ...0 Kccc .
Assuming that
( )kk ηγ exp= and ( ) ( )Θ′=Θ xx exp;ϕ ,
the hazard function can be written as:
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ); exp ; expk k k kt x d x d xλ η ϕ η ′Θ = Θ = + Θ , (6)
where kd  equals one if t falls within the interval ( ]kk cc ,1−  and equals
zero otherwise. Assuming only time-invariant covariates in x, the inte-
grated hazard is
( ) ( ) ( ) 1
0
; ;
k
l l k k
l
t x x b t cϕ γ γ +
=
 
Λ Θ = Θ + −   ∑ ,
where 11, +− ≤<−= kklll ctcccb  è 1...,,1,0 −= kk . The likelihood con-
tribution of a given individual, i, can now be written as
( ) ( ) ( )1 ; exp ;ici iiL t x t xλ  Θ = Θ −Λ Θ  , (7)
where ic  is a binary variable that is equal to one if the observation is un-
censored and equal to zero otherwise.
In our model we look at two types of risks of terminating registration with
the PEO: transition to employment with the assistance of the PEO and
other reasons for termination. The other reasons in our case are termi-
nations due to violations of the registration rules, which includes for ex-
ample individuals who find a job on their own and stop visiting the PEO.
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We removed individuals transiting to early retirement and retraining from
the analysis since these two groups are likely to have different models of
behavior.
In a competing risks framework, the hazard rate from unemployment
equals the sum of J different hazard rates where J denotes the number
of different risks, or exit destinations. The observed duration can be
written as
( )Jtttt ...,,,min 21= ,
and the individual contribution to the likelihood function is now
( ) ( ) ( ){ }2
1
; exp ;ij
J c jJ
i i i
j
L t x t xλ
=
 Θ = Θ −Λ Θ ∏ , (8)
where ijc  is a binary variable that equals one if individual i exits to state j
and it equals zero otherwise. Because of the assumption of independ-
ence among the risks, the estimation of the J durations can be done
separately and the contribution of an observed exit to destination jm ≠
to the likelihood in (8) is the same as that of a censored observation
in (7).
4. EMPIRICAL RESULTS
4.1. The Kaplan – Meier estimator and analysis
of factors influencing the duration of registration
at the PEO and unemployment duration
This section is concerned with the analysis of the likelihood of transition
to different time intervals of unemployment across different strata, esti-
mation of the risk of this transition, and testing the proportionality and
the distributions of the survival and hazard functions.14 To save space,
we report only part of the empirical results and limit ourselves to de-
scribing the results instead.
                                               
14 We use the LIFETEST procedure of SAS software to obtain the product-limit
(Kaplan – Meier) estimates of the survival functions and the lifetable method of
the same procedure to obtain the hazard function plot. The survival and the haz-
ard function graphs are drawn using intervals of 30 days. We report only selected
results in this paper. The detailed results can be obtained on request from the
authors or downloaded from www.eerc.ru.
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Our analysis covers a rather long period of time, two years, and is moti-
vated by the absence of major changes in the rules and regulations gov-
erning registered unemployment during that period. It goes without say-
ing that the economic situation in the country was changing during the
period under investigation. The economic turmoil taking place in Russia
all through the 1990s surely found its reflection in the labor market
trends and the dynamics of registered unemployment.
Appendix A2 depicts the duration of registered unemployment across the
calendar years. In 1997, the average duration of unemployment was
somewhat less than in 1998: 166.9 days versus 189.8 days. During
1997, the risk of transition from unemployment to employment was
higher than in 1998 for the duration of up to one year, but after the one
year period, the trends are changing. In 1997, 16.5% of all unemployed
obtained employment within 10 days while in 1998, it amounted only to
4.9%. The proportion of transition to employment after one month was
44.1% in 1997 and 31.8% in 1998. By the end of each year those num-
bers were 75.8% and 88,6% respectively.
The reason for these differences is most likely the financial crisis of
August 1998. The crisis resulted in a substantial inflow of unemployed
from the import sector and the banking and finance sector. An atmos-
phere of high uncertainty lead to employers withholding potential vacan-
cies. The increase in vacancies related to the revival of domestic pro-
duction was mostly directed at working professions. The demand for
white-collar jobs was consistently exceeding the number of suitable va-
cancies.15
Despite the differences in the average duration of unemployment within
two years, the profiles of risk functions are similar across strata. There is
some jump in the risk of transition after the first 10 days of registration,
after that the functions are parallel until one year when we observe a
substantial jump due to the expiry of unemployment benefit payments,
and after that the profiles of functions become unstable.
The analysis of the data indicated that the lack of homogeneity across
time could be explained by a relatively few outliers, with the period of
registration substantially exceeding the average one. Therefore, the pro-
ceeding analysis will be done for the whole period. Next we describe the
results of the Kaplan – Meier estimations for the whole period (see Ap-
pendix A3).
The average duration of unemployment is 180.9 days. The shapes of the
survival and hazard functions for the whole period are similar to the
functions for each separate year. We can observe "jumps" in the func-
                                               
15 Although we should also mention that the flow of labor from and to the financial
sector through the PEO was found to be very small.
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tions in the interval up to 10 days and after one year. In the interval from
10 days to one year, the functions look rather homogeneous. The hazard
function sharply increases for the duration period greater than one year
and the next increase is for durations close to 1.5 years. These dynamics
indicate that the behavior of the unemployed is likely to be influenced by
the rules limiting the maximum duration of registration with the PEO and
the rules concerning the payments of unemployment benefits. Of the un-
employed, 88% experience transition within one year of registration. The
fluctuations of the hazard function in the duration interval exceeding one
and a half years is explained by the presence of a relatively small group
of individuals registered for up to two or three years. Some of the indi-
viduals in that group became unemployed without unemployment bene-
fits for a period of up to 6 months after the expiration of their benefit
payments. If they do not get a suitable job offer during that period, they
can become the unemployed and receive unemployment benefits again.
In addition, the unemployed whose working experience exceeds 20 years
get two extra weeks of benefits for each year.16 That group of unem-
ployed mostly consists of individuals interested in an extended period of
registration with the PEO. These people often work unofficially and reg-
istration with the PEO provides them with medical insurance and conti-
nuity in their work record for future retirement benefits. Women domi-
nate this group since a large proportion of them are interested in being
housewives and looking after their children while preserving the social
benefits of employed individuals.
Part of the unemployed population in our data inquires to the PEO more
than once during the period under investigation. The proportion of indi-
viduals with multiple spells of unemployment amounted to 11% of the
observations: 9.1% of individuals have two unemployment spells while
the remaining part has three or more spells. Individuals with multiple un-
employment spells stay with the PEO on average two months less than
individuals with one spell.
We also consider the differences in unemployment duration and the risk
of transition from PEO registration for individuals who obtained employ-
ment with the assistance of the PEO and for those who terminated their
registration with the PEO without employment but who could get a job on
their own.17 Individuals transiting to employment stay registered with the
                                               
16 This increase can be obtained only once.
17 The group of unemployed terminating their registration with the PEO without
formal employment consists of diverse types of individuals with different motiva-
tions for being registered with the PEO. We do not study the behavior of each
subgroup since it would seriously complicate the structure and the size of the
study. Our main goal is to study the differences between the behavior of individu-
als obtaining employment with the assistance of the PEO and those who did not.
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PEO on average for 136.6 days: 11% of them find a job during the
first 10 days, 48% — during 3 months, 75% — during 7 months, and
95% — during one year. Those dynamics indicate that the behavior of
the unemployed is driven by a tradeoff between the costs and benefits of
preserving their unemployment status and an automatic decrease in their
unemployment benefits over time. The decrease in unemployment bene-
fits in the next period implies that more individuals will exit from unem-
ployment in the current period.
Individuals terminating their registration with the PEO without employ-
ment are most often classified by the PEO as the ones who violated the
rules of registration. The violations include terminating regular visits to
the PEO, violations of the conditions of re-registration, rejection of a
suitable job offer, imprisonment, changes in residence, fraud in obtaining
the unemployment benefits, etc. The most common reasons, which
amounted to 99.4% of all cases, are the rejection of employment and
violations of the re-registration rules. While registered with the PEO,
many individuals find a job on their own or leave for seasonal work and
stop coming to the PEO every two weeks as specified by law. Individuals
leaving the PEO due to violating registration rules stay with the PEO for
216.3 days on average, and they are more likely to belong to the group
of individual who are registered for longer periods. Individuals refusing to
take a job offer that according to the formal criterions suits them are
most likely dissatisfied with the job conditions and/or pay. Some indi-
viduals stay longer because of the lack of suitable vacancies. Often they
find a job on their own and stop visiting the PEO. In this case the IRS
would contain a record that such an individual is de-registered because
he stopped visiting the PEO.
The described facts indicate that individuals terminating their registration
with the PEO without formal employment may face a deficit of vacancies
available from the PEO. Therefore, we cannot consider that part of the
unemployed as uniformly being interested in longer periods of registra-
tion with the PEO. Clearly, the motivations of that group are less homo-
geneous than the ones who terminate their relationship with the PEO af-
ter obtaining employment through the PEO.
Appendix A4 reports the results of the stratification by the gender of the
registered unemployed. The total unemployment in 1998 based on the
methodology of ILO was 13.7% of economically active men and 13.3% of
economically active women. For the registered unemployed, the indica-
tors were 1.9% and 4% respectively. But what is the difference between
the duration of unemployment of men and women?
The average duration of unemployment for women exceeds the corre-
sponding one for men by over two months. It should also be noted that
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the difference between the median and mean is greater for men. During
the first 10 days, 18% of men transited to employment while the corre-
sponding number for women is only 6%. After one year the correspond-
ing numbers are 92% for men and 85% for women. Therefore, women
are more prone to prolonged unemployment.
The risk of transiting to employment is much higher for men in the early
stages of unemployment. After one year the risk sharply increases by
approximately the same magnitude for both men and women. Further
fluctuations of the risk function differ across strata, but the general pro-
files are similar to the ones in the unstratified sample.
The theory of job search tells us that the likelihood of employment is in-
fluenced by the demand and supply of labor and the professional and
qualification characteristics of an unemployed individual (his or her hu-
man capital). The increase in human capital increases the value of an in-
dividual to an employer. Other things equal, a high value of informal
household work increases the requirements for formal work. It follows
that women who value their household work more than formal employ-
ment would not inquire at the PEO, although a substantial number of
women are leaving their previous formal employment involuntarily, for
example, due to lay-offs or firm liquidation. Therefore, we can try to in-
vestigate whether the differences in unemployment duration between
men and women is a result of gender discrimination or women simply
exercising their right to register with the PEO to obtain the related bene-
fits instead of employment.
We created two interactive dummy variables: "women with children" and
"married women" and calculated the Kaplan – Meier estimates for those
variables. Women with children comprised 46.6% of the total number of
women and stayed with the PEO on average one month longer than all
other unemployed and one week longer than other women. Married
women account for 51.6% of all women and stay with the PEO even
longer — 56 days on average.
Clearly a potential employer might discriminate against women with chil-
dren but the increase in duration for all married women allows us to con-
clude that the driving factor of the longer duration is the presence of
other financial support in the family which allows married women to re-
main unemployed for a longer time.
The analysis of marital status indicates the longer duration of married in-
dividuals is mostly due to the contribution of married women.
The analysis of dummy variables for different age groups clearly indi-
cates that the duration of unemployment increases with age. To give an
extreme example, the average unemployment duration for the group
above 50 years old was twice the length than for the group below 20.
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The duration of unemployment increases with the level of education and
supports our hypothesis of a larger menu of suitable jobs for individuals
with lower levels of education. The individuals with general secondary
education though have smaller unemployment duration than those with
less than the general secondary education. This can be explained by the
fact that the latter group contains individuals with some level of profes-
sional education, which increases their criteria for a suitable job offer.
Our next step is to examine the dependency of the behavior of the un-
employment the amount of unemployment benefit received by the reg-
istered unemployed. We looked at the risk of transition to employment as
dependent on the amount of benefits received. The results indicate that
unemployment duration is much lower for individuals receiving minimum
unemployment benefits — 140 versus 252 days for non-minimum benefit
recipients on average. The minimum benefits are related to the minimum
wage and not connected with the subsistence level, amounting only to
10 – 15% of it. Therefore, the income equal to the minimum benefits
does not provide sufficient funds for an unemployed individual to "sur-
vive" while looking for a suitable job and therefore does not fulfill its so-
cial-economic function. Individuals receiving minimum benefits are likely
to be in need of extra income from other sources, which takes the form
of family transfers and income from unofficial employment. Moreover ac-
cording to the unemployment law, individuals with minimum benefits are
typically more limited in their choice of suitable employment and that al-
lows the PEO to find them a job faster.
We should mention that the presence of extra benefits such as the de-
pendant's benefits increases the unemployment duration by over one
month.
We also used the stratification based on whether individuals are entering
unemployment from outside of the labor force or not. The results indi-
cate that individuals who were not employed prior to registering with the
PEO find a job faster which again relates to the fewer criteria of a suit-
able job offer held by those individuals.
The profession of an individual's previous employment plays a rather im-
portant role in the duration of unemployment. Individuals without a pro-
fession (according to the PEO definition) have the smallest duration —
123 days. Blue-collar professionals do not find a job that fast, but the
average duration of their unemployment is still lower by about 100 days
than the average 224 days for white-collar professionals. Of the blue-
collar unemployed, 18% terminate their registration with the PEO after 10
days while for white-collar professionals and individuals with no profes-
sion that proportion is 3% and 10% respectively. After three months, the
exit rate of blue-collar professionals decreases below the level of indi-
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viduals with no profession, but it is still higher than the exit rate for white-
collar professionals.
For those who did not have a profession, the criteria for a suitable job
are more flexible than previously mentioned. As a result, the exit rate
from unemployment for that group is higher.
The duration of unemployment also depends on the circumstances for
the unemployment. The intensity of a job search may depend on whether
the unemployed voluntarily quit his or her previous job or was fired. The
theory of job search predicts that an increase in the unemployment du-
ration will result in a decrease in the reservation wage and that will in-
crease the risk of transition to employment. On the other hand, potential
employers often consider unemployed individuals with large breaks in
their employment records and those who were fired from their previous
job as low quality labor and that might decrease the risk of transition to
employment. As we expected, the risk of transition to employment of in-
dividuals who voluntarily quit their previous employment is much higher
than other groups.
Finally we should mention the similarities in the profiles of the functions
of all analyzed variables. Hazard functions sharply increase for intervals
of 10 days and one year. Clearly there exists a certain model of behavior
resulting in substantial outflow during the first 10 days of unemployment.
During one year most of the unemployed individuals experience a transi-
tion. The periods of duration exceeding one year are characterized by
the unstable behavior of the hazard rate, which indicates substantial dif-
ferences in the motivations of unemployed individuals with the corre-
sponding duration of unemployment.
4.2. Estimation results of the Cox proportional hazard model
The duration of unemployment and the rate of transition from unem-
ployment are determined by a complex set of factors, which we consid-
ered separately in the previous section. The potential interrelationship
among these factors indicates the necessity of their joint analysis to
factor out "the net effect." We choose to estimate a proportional hazard
model with a flexible baseline hazard. The hazard rate is assumed to be
constant within duration intervals but is allowed to differ among duration
intervals. The piecewise constant baseline hazard was specified by di-
viding the unemployment duration into 30-day intervals for the period of
up to one year and the last interval include all individuals with unem-
ployment duration exceeding one year. We formed binary variables Ti for
each interval i as Ti = 1 if an individual was registered as unemployed
with the PEO in duration period i and zero otherwise.
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To remove the problem of serial correlation for the individuals with multi-
ple spells of unemployment, we retained only the observations for the
first spell of unemployment. Our results also provided an indirect evi-
dence that the behavior of individuals with multiple spells of unemploy-
ment could be significantly different.
We estimated two competing risk models. The first model is related to
the risk of transition to employment with the assistance of the PEO. The
second model considers the risk of transition from registration with the
PEO to other destinations. To estimate the two risks separately, the first
model assumes that the completed spells are the ones ending with tran-
sition to employment with the assistance of the PEO while alternative
destinations are right-censored. The estimation of the second model
follows the same logic: all spells ending with employment with the assis-
tance of the PEO are rightcensored while alternative destinations are
completed spells.18
The results of the estimation in Table 5 reveal significant differences in
the behavior of individuals transiting to employment with the assistance
of the PEO and other individuals. For example, the results show that the
risk of transiting to employment with the assistance of the PEO does not
depend on the gender of the unemployed (see Model 1 in Table 5). In
Model 2, the rate of exiting from the PEO system for men is significantly
greater than for women, which hints at the higher chances of men find-
ing a job on their own; the absence of the PEO's assistance reveals the
gender preferences of employers.
We included in the model two dummy variables capturing the risk of
transition from unemployment for women. One of them takes the value
of one for married women and zero otherwise, while the other equals to
one for women with children and zero otherwise. The coefficients of the
variables alter the sign in the estimated models. The risk of transition to
employment with the assistance of the PEO is lower for married women
compared to other individuals and higher when women find a job on their
own. This indicates that the financial support from their families is likely
to be more important for women than men. The variable for women with
children is not significant in both models, but the presence of extra
benefits for dependants lowers the risk of transition.
                                               
18 The models were estimated using the LIFEREG procedure of SAS software. For
the Weibull (or exponential) distribution, the accelerated failure time model used
in this procedure is also a proportional-hazard model. The estimated model is
specified in terms of the survival function and in the case of our piecewise con-
stant exponential model, the signs of the coefficients were reverted to interpret
them with respect to the hazard.
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Table 5. Competing risk models based on the Cox proportional hazard model.
Parameter estimate
Exit from the PEO
with employment
(Model 1)
Exit from the PEO
without employment
(Model 2)
Intercept 6.6502*** (0.0700) 7.2812*** (0.1384)
Male –0.0005    (0.0469) 0.3028**  (0.1032)
Up to 20 years old 0.3089*** (0.0483) –0.0805    (0.0972)
21 – 30 years old 0.3406*** (0.0363) –0.0464    (0.0731)
31 – 40 years old 0.3000*** (0.0362) 0.0338    (0.0730)
41 – 50 years old 0.1947*** (0.0344) –0.0472    (0.0653)
High education –0.0202    (0.4846) –0.2925*** (0.0617)
Professional secondary education –0.0343    (1.5109) –0.1682**  (0.0579)
General secondary education 0.0767**  (0.0289) –0.0418    (0.0603)
Married 0.1514*** (0.0357) –0.1689**  (0.0784)
Married women –0.1518*** (0.0411) 0.2460**  (0.0883)
Women with children –0.0647    (0.0410) 0.0775    (0.0921)
Blue-collar –0.0988**  (0.0385) 0.1567**  (0.0798)
White-collar –0.1956*** (0.0366) 0.0378    (0.0753)
Minimum unemployment benefits 0.1314*** (0.0205) 0.6311*** (0.0430)
Extra benefits for dependants –0.0793*** (0.0232) –0.1175**   (0.0489)
From out of the labor force –0.0778**  (0.2939) 0.0783    (0.0569)
Voluntarily quit last job 0.1828*** (0.0192) –0.0170    (0.0407)
T1 = 1, if 0 <= duration <= 30 3.5429*** (0.0398) 0.6344*** (0.1140)
T2 = 1, if 30 < duration <= 60 2.1827*** (0.0423) 0.8488*** (0.0764)
T3 = 1, if 60 < duration <= 90 1.6470*** (0.0433) 0.5456*** (0.0722)
T4 = 1, if 90 < duration <= 120 1.3217*** (0.4282) 0.1549**   (0.0755)
T5 = 1, if 120 < duration <= 150 1.1381*** (0.0451) 0.1086    (0.0780)
T6 = 1, if 150 < duration <= 180 0.9350*** (0.0479) –0.1015    (0.0857)
T7 = 1, if 180 < duration <= 210 0.8815*** (0.0487) –0.0850    (0.0848)
T8 = 1, if 210 < duration <= 240 0.7706*** (0.0516) –0.3637*** (0.0984)
T9 = 1, if 240 < duration <= 270 0.6619*** (0.0527) –0.4323*** (0.0995)
T10 = 1, if 270 < duration <= 300 0.6264*** (0.0560) –0.5248*** (0.1118)
T11 = 1, if 300 < duration <= 330 0.5380*** (0.0584) –0.6270*** (0.1198)
T12 = 1, if 330 < duration <= 365 0.2169*** (0.0455) 0.0044    (0.0634)
T13 = 1, if duration > 365 — —
Log Likelihood for EXPONENT –19640.83169 –8147.353348
All variables are dummy variables.
*** — 1% significance, ** — 5% significance, and * — 10% significance.
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The models confirm that age is a significant determinant of the risk of
transition to employment with the assistance of the PEO. The reference
group for the age variable is the group of unemployed over 50 years old.
The risk of transition decreases with age in Model 1, while the results in
Model 2 are insignificant. The age preferences of employers are re-
vealed only in the vacancies offered through the PEO.
Relative to the unemployed with less than general secondary education,
individuals with general secondary education have the highest risk of
transition to employment with the assistance of the PEO. This can be ex-
plained by the fact that the absence of professional education (of any
level) lowers the criteria for a suitable job offer for the latter group. The
presence of university education or secondary professional education
lowers the risk of transition relative to other groups in Model 2. Unem-
ployed individuals without a profession (according to the PEO definition)
are more likely to transit to employment with the assistance of the PEO
than individuals with a profession. A straightforward explanation for this
fact could be that the rules for registering with the PEO make it difficult
for the former group of unemployed to discriminate among alternative
vacancies. In other words, the number of suitable vacancies is greater
for individuals without a profession. The number of vacancies for white-
collar professionals tends to be significantly smaller than those for blue-
collar professionals. The results of the Model 2 show that higher labor
demand for blue-collar workers results in their significantly higher
chances of finding a job on their own.
The minimum size of the unemployment benefits significantly increases
the risk of transition from unemployment. Therefore, insufficient income
support is likely to result in higher intensity job searches or in lower cri-
teria for a suitable job. In addition, the risk is higher in Model 2.
Individuals entering the PEO out of the labor force have a lower risk of
transiting to employment with the assistance of the PEO (see Model 1)
while the result in Model 2 is insignificant. The negative effect in Model 1
can be explained by the fact that a significant part of the individuals en-
tering unemployment out of the labor force are graduates with profes-
sional education which allows them to choose their employment accord-
ing to their profession. The complementary supply side explanation
would be that potential employers are likely to prefer fulfilling vacancies
with more experienced workers.
The risks for individuals who left their last job voluntarily differ between
Model 1 and Model 2. For those who find employment with the assis-
tance of the PEO, the risk of transition is higher while Model 2 gives
negative but insignificant result. This supports our hypothesis that the in-
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dividuals who voluntary quit their employment anticipate their relative ad-
vantage in finding a job through the PEO.
The rules of registering with the PEO and receiving unemployment bene-
fits highlight the possibility that the duration of registration with the PEO
could itself significantly affect the risk of transition from unemployment.
The most straightforward factor encouraging an exit from unemployment
is of course the financial one — the amount of unemployment benefits is
decreasing over time (at least for individuals receiving non-minimum
benefits). On the other hand, some groups of the unemployed could be
interested in retaining their unemployment status for a longer time. An-
other reason encouraging a fast exit could be "the stigma" attached to
being unemployed. Moreover, employers might prefer individuals with a
shorter unemployment duration, interpreting it as a signal of better qual-
ity of labor. To account for risks related to the above-mentioned factors,
we introduced variables accounting for the duration of unemployment
into the model. The duration dependence of the exit rate from registered
unemployment in our model is captured by variables T1 – T13, which de-
pend of the duration of unemployment. The duration dependency coeffi-
cients indicate whether or not, conditional on the explanatory variables,
the exit rate changes over the duration of unemployment. These
changes may occur because of employers' behavior, workers' behavior,
or a combination of both. If employers prefer short-term unemployment
to long-term unemployment then the exit rate to a job steadily declines
over the duration of unemployment. If unemployed individuals are dis-
couraged by remaining unemployed and decrease their job search inten-
sity, the exit rate will also decline. It may also be that the rules of the
benefit system influence the exit rate. The unemployed may be inclined
to leave unemployment just before there is a drop in their benefits. In
that case we can expect sudden jumps in the exit rate instead of a grad-
ual change. Therefore, the pattern of duration dependency may provide
information about the effect of financial incentives, which change over
the duration of unemployment.
The results in Model 1 indicate a decrease in the exit rate for longer du-
ration periods. In Model 2, the exit rate from the PEO system increases
in the second month and declines afterwards becoming insignificant af-
ter the fourth month of unemployment and increasing again between the
eighth and eleventh months. The pattern of duration dependency of the
exit rate captured by Model 1 can be explained based on the personal
observations of the authors of this article. The structure of vacancies
available from the PEO of Rostov-on-Don was quite homogeneous during
the period under observation. Most of the vacancies available from the
PEO were not very attractive, often low-skilled jobs. In addition, a signifi-
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cant number of people registered with the PEO do not have very high
criteria for a suitable job. Therefore, the greatest exit rate is usually ob-
served shortly after registration, which simply represents the process of
fulfilling unattractive vacancies with individuals with lower criteria for a
suitable job. The higher skilled unemployed individuals most likely have
to stay with the PEO longer to find a suitable job, but they also exit in a
reasonably short period. The continuing process of filling vacancies re-
sults in a positive and significant exit rate that decreases with the dura-
tion of unemployment. The increasing exit rate for the longer duration
intervals in Model 2 indicates that individuals who are not able to obtain
employment through the PEO increase their job search intensity outside
the PEO toward the end of the official period of having unemployment
status.
4.3. The rules for obtaining unemployment
status and the characteristics
of the individuals inquiring at the PEO
We already mentioned the fact that the total level of unemployment in
Russia is significantly greater than the level of registered unemployment.
It should be mentioned that a number of factors bias the level of regis-
tered unemployment downward. As we mentioned earlier, individuals who
satisfy all the criteria of being unemployed but obtain a job during the
first 10 days of registration with the PEO are not included in the unem-
ployment indicator. Thus, the unemployment level at the end of the
month would include only individuals with unemployment status who are
registered at the end of the month. If an unemployed individual inquired
at the PEO during the coarse of the month and received a job before its
end, he or she would not be included in the unemployment indicator.
We illustrate the importance of the above problem by including in our
previous analysis all individuals who registered with the PEO to find a
suitable job but deregistered within 10 days without receiving unemploy-
ment status. During the period from January 1997 to May 1999, 45.4%
of individuals registered with the PEO deregistered within 10 days.
Moreover, 95.6% of this group found employment through the PEO.
Therefore, a large group of registered individuals finding a job with PEO
assistance may not be counted as unemployed. If we assume that the
total level of registered unemployment was 1.2% during the period under
study, the inclusion of the unemployed registered for 10 days would in-
crease its level to 2.15%. We can compare the outflow rates from the
PEO for the two groups of unemployed to observe the phenomenon we
just described (see Fig. 2).
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Of the individuals transiting from the PEO system within 10 days, 60%
are people below 30 years old. Similarly to the other group of unem-
ployed, it may indicate that young people have softer criteria for a suit-
able job than older people. Men constitute the majority of individuals
leaving the PEO system within 10 days.
Since the majority of vacancies offered by the PEO are low-skilled and
blue-collar professionals, individuals with such professions or willing to
accept such a profession would have higher chances of employment.
Remarkably, among individuals registered for 10 days only 19% had
professions prior to unemployment but 85% (!) obtained this type of em-
ployment. The group registered less for than 10 days is dominated by
individuals without complete secondary education; the individuals with
higher education are more likely to stay with the PEO for longer periods
of time.
In this section we use the logistic model to study the joint effect of
various factors on the probability of leaving the PEO system within 10
days. The dependant variable is DUR, which takes the value of 1 if the
registered individual stayed with the PEO for more than 10 days and 0
otherwise.
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Fig. 2. The outflow rates from the PEO for individuals registered up
to 10 days and longer. 
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The model takes the following form:
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All variables are defined in Table 4 except KOL_DET = number of chil-
dren below 16 years old. We obtain our results using SAS (Statistical
Analysis System) software, which uses the following specification of the
logit model: p = Pr (y = 0) = F (α + β'X), where y is a vector of the de-
pendent variable and X is a matrix of explanatory ones.
In the process of constructing the model, we deleted individuals with in-
complete spells below 10 days since they can later transit to Group 2.
The results of the regression are provided in Table 6.
Table 6. Logit procedure for factors determining transition from the PEO within
10 days of registration.
Explanatory variables Parameter
estimate
Standard
error
Risk ratio
Intercept 1.39*** 0.05 —
Gender 1.13*** 0.02 1.14
Up to 20 years old 0.85*** 0.05 2.34
21 – 30 years old 0.27*** 0.04 1.32
31 – 40 years old 0.36*** 0.04 1.44
41 – 50 years old 0.08** 0.04 1.08
High education –0.91*** 0.04 0.40
Professional secondary education –0.82*** 0.03 0.44
General secondary education –0.15*** 0.02 0.86
Married 0.65*** 0.03 0.92
Number of children –0.69*** 0.02 0.50
Blue-collar –2.73*** 0.03 0.07
White-collar –3.29*** 0.04 0.04
Voluntarily quit last job 0.77*** 0.03 2.17
From out of the labor force –1.62*** 0.03 0.20
Number of observations = 71531
–2 Log L = 98042.01
*** — indicates 1% significance, ** — 5% significance.
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According to Table 6, men have higher chances of obtaining a job during
the first 10 days than women. The group with an unemployment duration
of over 10 days is indeed dominated by women, which is confirmed by a
high odds ratio.
The highest probability of transiting to employment during the first ten
days is for individuals aged below 20 years old. An increase in age re-
sults in a decrease in the likelihood of finding a job within ten days.
When it comes to education, a high level of education increases the
chances of remaining in the PEO system for more than 10 days and ob-
taining unemployment status. Not married and divorced individuals have
lower chances of finding a job within 10 days after registration. Having
more children negatively influences the probability of obtaining a job
within 10 days. Individuals who were not in the labor force prior to en-
tering the PEO are less likely to leave it within 10 days. Individuals with
professions have a higher probability than those without a profession of
remaining in the PEO system for more than 10 days.19
Confirming our expectations, the individuals who voluntarily quit their
jobs find employment faster than the alternative groups. It is worth men-
tioning that the odds ratio for this variable is very high — 2.16.
Summarizing, we can state that the model indicates substantial hetero-
geneity between people leaving the PEO within 10 days and those who
stay there and become officially unemployed. So, what groups of unem-
ployed are more mobile and more demanded on the registered segment
of unemployment?
According to our model they are individuals with relatively lower levels of
education and lower levels of qualification who are less restricted in their
choice of suitable employment and willing to accept a wider array of job
opportunities. It is also likely that the PEO finds it easier to find a job that
satisfies the criteria for a suitable job for the above individuals. The sec-
ond category of individuals more likely to find a job quickly are those in-
dividuals who voluntarily quit their jobs "rationally," anticipating finding a
new job. The transition to official unemployment is more likely for indi-
viduals with higher criteria for a suitable job and who face a lower num-
ber of vacancies in the labor market.
So far we have shown that a substantial part of the unemployed inquiring
at the PEO may not be included in the official figures of unemployment.
We have also shown that individuals obtaining employment within 10
days of registration significantly differ from those staying with the PEO
for longer periods and obtaining unemployment status.
                                               
19 According to the PEO definition.
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We argue that all individuals without a job inquiring at the PEO to obtain
one should be considered as unemployed irrespective of the duration of
unemployment. Not accounting for these groups of individuals biases the
level of registered unemployment downward and provides an incorrect
picture of the composition of the registered unemployed.
5. CONCLUSIONS
The study of registered unemployment in Russia is a relatively new area
of empirical research. In our paper we attempt to show the possibilities
of empirical analysis using the data collected by the Public Employment
Offices (PEOs). We used the data from the largest industrial city in the
south of Russia — Rostov-on-Don.
Our main results are the following:
• The rules and regulations governing the registration of individuals as
unemployed at the PEO, as well as the size of unemployment benefits
significantly effect the duration of registered unemployment and the risk
of transition to alternative states.
• The analysis of unemployment duration using the Kaplan – Meyer es-
timates showed significant heterogeneity on all stratums specified in the
course of the study. That indicates the significant differences in the be-
havior of the registered unemployed reflected in the varying periods of
registration with the PEO and the risks of transition from unemployment.
• The analysis of the variables we studied allowed us to distinguish
three types of individuals with different motivations for registering with
the PEO. The first group includes individuals who find a job within 10
days of registration due to a higher demand for their labor or their low
criteria for a suitable job, which allows them to accept unpopular and
low-paid employment. The second group includes individuals who obtain
unemployment status and experience a transition within a year. The third
group tends to be motivated to retain their unemployment status and
prolong their registration with the PEO. We find significant differences in
the socio-demographic and professional characteristics of the individuals
in all three groups.
• The individuals with low suitable job criteria who are more likely to ex-
perience fast transition from unemployment tend to be younger people
entering the labor market for the first time and having little professional
experience and few skills.
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• Our analysis reveals that women tend to be segregated in the seg-
ment of the labor market that we studied. Other things equal, women
have a lower risk of transition to employment. We suppose that it can be
an indicator of women using registration with the PEO as a tool for
working in their household and taking care of children while preserving
continuity in their work record and medical insurance. The coefficients of
the model indicate that the above insight is true for women who have fi-
nancial support from their families.
• The size of unemployment benefits significantly effects the duration of
unemployment. Individuals receiving the minimum benefits experience a
higher risk of transition than the individuals receiving higher benefits.
Starting with May 1999, the rules regarding financial compensation to
the registered unemployed were changed. In particular, the simultaneous
payments of unemployment insurance and unemployment benefits in the
first three months of registration were cancelled. In addition, people sent
to do the community service were allowed to receive wages from that job
and retain their unemployment status and unemployment benefits. In our
opinion, the influence of these factors on unemployment duration de-
serve further investigation given the incentive effects of transfers to the
unemployed and their scarcity due to budget problems.
• Analysis of the determinants of the risk of transition using competing
risk models showed that transition to employment results in a lower du-
ration of unemployment.
• The unemployment duration patterns and different risks of transition
from registered unemployment obtained in this paper to a large extent
coincide with the one obtained in Foley (1997) despite the fact that the
author uses the RSLM data with a more general definition of unemploy-
ment. That suggests that the problems raised in this paper are common
for the Russian labor market in general and should be taken into account
in developing social programs for the labor market.
• We found that the data on registered unemployment does not take
into account a large part of the unemployed transiting to employment
within 10 days of registration and the unemployed whose unemployment
falls in between the dates of reporting the registered unemployment.
These facts may result in substantial underestimation of registered un-
employment.
• The Public Employment Office is a relatively new institution in the
Russian labor market. The rules of registering and obtaining benefits to-
gether with the specific features of the Russian economic crisis signifi-
cantly affect the behavior of individuals in this segment of the labor mar-
MODELING LABOR MARKET BEHAVIOR40
ket. Very often these effects are hard to explain in the framework of
classical job search theory. The empirical study of the process in the
Russian labor market may help to modify the assumptions of the tradi-
tional theories and serve as a base for developing the economic theory
of transition economies.
The general conclusion of our paper is that the information contained in
the individual registration cards of the PEOs is very rich and can be ex-
tensively studied using the empirical methods of transition data analysis.
These methods are well developed in western literature and have not yet
been widely applied in Russia.
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APPENDICES
A1. The rules and regulations governing registration
with the PEO and receiving unemployment status
According to the Law of the Russian Federation "On Employment of the
Population in the Russian Federation," an unemployed individual is the
one who simultaneously satisfies the following criteria:
• belongs to the labor force;
• presently without a job and income;
• actively searching for a job;
• willing to take on a job;
• inquiring with the PEO for assistance in finding a job.
Unemployed individuals are registered with the PEO according to the
procedure set by law and in the following sequence:
• primary registration of unemployed individuals;20
• registration of unemployed individuals seeking a suitable job;
• registration of individuals with unemployed status;
• repeated registration of unemployed individuals.
The PEO is obliged to offer an individual two suitable jobs during the first
10 days following an inquiry, subject to job availability. Suitable job offers
can include both an offer of permanent employment as well as an offer
of temporary employment. The individuals entering the labor market for
the first time may receive two offers of professional training.
Unemployment status is awarded to an individual who (simultaneously):
• is in the labor force;
• does not have any income;
• is registered with the PEO to find a suitable job;
• is unemployed following 10 days after his or her initial inquiry at
the PEO.
                                               
20 At this stage, the PEO offers "consulting services" to inquiring individuals
without asking for identification.
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The nature of the suitable jobs offered by the PEO to an individual with
unemployment status depends on the circumstances of becoming un-
employed.
The first criterion of a suitable job is the profession that can be de-
manded by an unemployed individual. Laid-off individuals and those who
voluntarily quit their last job should be offered a job in the same profes-
sion as their last employment irrespective of the profession stated on
their education diploma. Graduates of higher and specialized schools
should be offered a job corresponding to their diplomas. Graduates of
secondary schools are typically sent to professional training. Individuals
who did not work for an extended period of time (over 3 years) can be
offered any job or sent for retraining.
The second criterion is wage. The PEO should offer an unemployed indi-
vidual a wage that is not less that the one received at the last job. For
those who had a high wage at their last job, a suitable wage offer should
be at least the average wage for a given administrative territory (oblast,
in our case). Suitable offers to individuals who did not work prior to reg-
istering at the PEO are limited only by the minimum wage in the country.
The third criterion (common to all groups) is that the offered suitable job
should be located within the administrative border of the city and com-
muting to the job should not involve more than two transfers on public
transportation.
The rules governing the amount and timing of unemployment
benefits. The amount of unemployment benefits is related to the sal-
ary/wage the unemployed individual received at the previous place of
work. A "suitable wage," in turn, depends on the same amount but does
not have to be higher than the average salary/wage in oblast.
Unemployment benefits are awarded to individuals with unemployment
status who left their last employment due to any reason. These benefits
are calculated as a percent of the average wage during the preceding
three months if the individual had a paid full-time job during at least 26
consecutive weeks (or the equivalent) in the 12 months prior to register-
ing with the PEO.
Individuals entering the job market for the first time and those who do
not fulfill the conditions above obtain unemployment benefits equal to
the minimum wage.
In the presence of dependants, unemployment benefits are increased by
the amount equal to 50 per cent of the minimum wage for each depend-
ant, but the total amount cannot exceed 1.5 of the minimum wage.
The individuals who are not of retirement age but with a length of work
sufficient for retirement may receive benefits for 24 months cumulatively
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during 36 calendar months. In the absence of suitable jobs, this group
may agree on early retirement, but not prior to two years before the re-
tirement age set by the law.
An unemployed individual starts receiving benefit payments right after
obtaining unemployment status. The duration of the benefit payments
should not exceed 12 cumulative months during 18 calendar months
(except for early retirement).
Individuals who do not receive a suitable job during 18 months can re-
new their application and obtain minimum unemployment benefits.
The amount of unemployment benefits equals 75 per cent of the wage
received at the previous job during the first 3 months, 60 percent during
the next 4 months, and later on — 45 per cent. In all cases, the benefits
must not be below the minimum wage and not higher than average
wages in a given administrative territory.
From April 1996 to May 1999, laid-off individuals simultaneously receive
unemployment insurance from the employer (amounting to the average
wage) as well as unemployment benefits from the PEO during the first
three months of unemployment. We suppose that such an arrangement
created extra incentives for preserving one's unemployment status, but
the insufficient period of time that elapsed since abandoning this rule
hinders us from testing potential shifts in unemployment duration.
Our analysis of rules and regulations governing registered unemployment
shows that there are rather few factors contributing to the differentiation
of unemployment benefits across various groups of individuals.
The funding of unemployment assistance (The Employment Fund) is
formed from the transfers of employers, employees, and if necessary
contributions from the Federal and local budgets. The Employment Fund
is a state-owned fund and its resources are not part of the Federal
budget.
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A2. Kaplan – Meier estimation stratified
by years: 1997 and 1998
Table A1. Summary statistics for time variable DURB.
Point 95% Confidence interval
Quintile Estimate Lower Upper
Year = 1, if 1998
75% 322.000 315.000 328.000
50% 150.000 147.000 155.000
25% 61.000 59.000 62.000
Mean — 189.757         Standard error — 1.331
Year = 0, if 1997
75% 287.000 280.000 295.000
50% 112.000 108.000 116.000
25% 34.000 32.000 36.000
Mean — 166.923         Standard error — 1.502
Table A2. Summary of the number of censored and uncensored values.
YEAR Total Failed Censored % Censored
0 13673 10724 2949 21.5681
1 11015 10988 27 0.2451
Total 24688 21712 2976 12.0544
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A3. Kaplan – Meier estimation of unemployment
duration for the whole period.
Table A3. Summary statistics for time variable DURB (duration of unemploy-
ment).
Point 95% Confidence interval
Quintile Estimate Lower Upper
75% 309.000 303.000 315.000
50% 133.000 130.000 136.000
25% 48.000 47.000 50.000
Mean — 180.885         Standard error — 1.016
Table A4. Summary of the number of censored and uncensored values.
Total Failed Censored % Censored
24687 21711 2976 12.0549
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A4. Kaplan – Meier estimation stratified
by gender of the unemployed
Table A5. Summary statistics for time variable DURB.
Point 95% Confidence interval
Quintile Estimate Lower Upper
SEX = 0, if Female
75% 354.000 349.000 361.000
50% 169.000 165.000 174.000
25% 66.000 63.000 69.000
Mean — 203.933         Standard error — 1.268
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Continued from p. 48
Point 95% Confidence interval
Quintile Estimate Lower Upper
SEX =1, if Male
75% 208.000 200.000 200.000
50% 87.000 84.000 90.000
25% 23.000 21.000 26.000
Mean — 137.692         Standard error — 1.594
Table A6. Summary of the number of censored and uncensored values.
SEX Total Failed Censored % Censored
0 16089 13766 2323 14.4384
1 8598 7945 653 7.5948
Total 24687 21711 2976 12.0549
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Fig. A5. Survival function.
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